Adam Smith - If you can get through it he's good. It's worth doing so you can see where all the people mis-quote him. I've heard his 'Theory of Moral Sentiment' is actually a better work then 'Wealth of Nations'. I've only partly read wealth.
I couldn't resist this quote from Adam Smith:
The necessaries of life occasion the great expense of the poor. . . . The luxuries and vanities of life occasion the principal expense of the rich, and a magnificent house embellishes and sets off to the best advantage all the other luxuries and vanities which they possess. . . . It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion.
Hehe, I bet that will drive many of the Capitalists here nuts. Nice find .
"The Greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge."-Stephen Hawking
"First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a communist;
Then they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a socialist;
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a trade unionist;
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out— because I was not a Jew;
Then they came for me— and there was no one left to speak out for me." -Martin Niemöller
Stupidity Annoys Me
Registered: Feb 2004
Originally posted by shaolin_Z
Hehe, I bet that will drive many of the Capitalists here nuts. Nice find .
But remember, spreading the wealth = socialism!!!
Be a Good One!
Registered: Nov 2001
Location: Brasilia, Brazil and Manaus, Brazil
Paul Feyerabend ( >> January 13, 1924 - February 11, 1994 << )
"'Anything goes' is not the one and only 'principle' of a new methodology, recommended by me. It is the only way in which those firmly committed to universal standards and wishing to understand history in their terms can describe my account of traditions and research practices ... If this account is correct then all a rationalist can say about science (and about any other interesting activity) is: anything goes" - Paul Feyerabend
Biography: Paul Karl Feyerabend was born into a middle-class Viennese family in 1924. Times were hard in Vienna in the nineteen-twenties: in the aftermath of the First World War there were famines, hunger riots, and runaway inflation. Feyerabend's family had a three-room apartment on the Wolfganggasse, “a quiet street lined with oak trees” (p. 11). The first chapters of his autobiography give the impression of his being a strange child, whose activities were entirely centred around his own family, and who was cut off from neighbors, other children and the outside world because “[t]he world is a dangerous place” (p. 15). Between the ages of three and six, Feyerabend recalls, he spent most of his time in the apartment's kitchen and bedroom. Occasional visits to the cinema and numerous stories, especially stories with a magical aura, seem to have taken the place usually filled by childhood friends. He was a sickly child, but ran away from home once, when he was five years old (p. 7). When he started school at the age of six, he “had no idea how other people lived or what to do with them” (p. 16). The world seemed to be filled with strange and inexplicable happenings. It took him some while to get used to school, which initially made him sick. But when he did so, his health problems had disappeared. When he learned to read, he found the new and magical world of books waiting for him, and indulged himself to the full (p. 25). But his sense of the world's inexplicability took some time to dissipate—he recalls feeling that way about events during the nineteen-thirties and throughout the second world war.
Feyerabend attended a Realgymnasium (High School) at which he was taught Latin, English, and science. He was a Vorzugsschüler, that is, “a student whose grades exceeded a certain average” (p. 22), and by the time he was sixteen he had the reputation of knowing more about physics and math than his teachers. But he also got thrown out of school on one occasion.
Feyerabend “stumbled into drama” (p. 26) by accident, becoming something of a ham actor in the process. This accident then led to another, when he found himself forced to accept philosophy texts among the bundles of books he had bought for the plays and novels they contained. It was, he later claimed, “the dramatic possibilities of reasoning and… the power that arguments seem to exert over people” (p. 27) with which philosophy fascinated him. Although his reputation was as a philosopher, he preferred to be thought of as an entertainer. His interests, he said, were always somewhat unfocussed (p. 27).
However, Feyerabend's school physics teacher Oswald Thomas inspired in him an interest in physics and astronomy. The first lecture he gave (at school) seems to have been on these subjects (p. 28). Together with his father, he built a telescope and “became a regular observer for the Swiss Institute of Solar Research” (p. 29). He describes his scientific interests as follows:
I was interested in both the technical and the more general aspects of physics and astronomy, but I drew no distinction between them. For me, Eddington, Mach (his Mechanics and Theory of Heat), and Hugo Dingler (Foundations of Geometry) were scientists who moved freely from one end of their subject to the other. I read Mach very carefully and made many notes. (p. 30).
Feyerabend does not tell us how he became acquainted with another one of his main preoccupations—singing. He was proud of his voice, becoming a member of a choir, and took singing lessons for years, later claiming to have remained in California in order not to have to give up his singing teacher. In his autobiography he talks of the pleasure, greater than any intellectual pleasure, derived from having and using a well-trained singing voice (p. 83). During his time in Vienna in the second world war, his interest led him to attend the opera (first the Volksoper, and then the Staatsoper) together with his mother. A former opera singer, Johann Langer, gave him singing lessons and encouraged him to go to an academy. After passing the entrance examination, Feyerabend did so, becoming a pupil of Adolf Vogel. At this point in his life, he later recalled:
The course of my life was… clear: theoretical astronomy during the day, preferably in the domain of perturbation theory; then rehearsals, coaching, vocal exercises, opera in the evening…; and astronomical observation at night… The only remaining obstacle was the war. (p. 35).
2.12 The Late Sixties
During the summer of 1966, Feyerabend lectured on church dogma at Berkeley. (“Why church dogma? Because the development of church dogma shares many features with the development of scientific thought” (pp. 137–8)). He eventually turned these thoughts into a paper on “Classical Empiricism”, published in 1970, in which he argued that empiricism shared certain problematic features with protestantism. He had already come some way from his 1965 defence of a “disinfected”, “tolerant” form of Empiricism. The publication, in 1969, of the four-page article, “Science Without Experience”, which argued that in principle experience is necessary at no point in the construction, comprehension or testing of empirical scientific theories finally gave notice that Feyerabend was no longer concerned to present himself as any kind of empiricist.
Despite taking his academic duties and responsibilities decreasingly seriously, and coming into conflict with his own university's administration as a result, Feyerabend had not yet fouled his substantial reputation as a serious philosopher of science. He reports that he received job offers from London, Berlin, Yale, and Auckland, that he was invited to become a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and that he corresponded with Friedrich von Hayek (whom he already knew from the Alpbach seminars) about a job in Freiburg (p. 127). He accepted the posts in London, Berlin, and Yale. In 1968, he resigned from UC Berkeley and left for Minneapolis, but grew homesick, got re-appointed, and returned to Berkeley almost immediately.
In London, lecturing to University College and the LSE, he met Imre Lakatos. The two became great friends, corresponding with one another regularly and voluminously until Lakatos' death. Feyerabend recalls that Lakatos, whose office was across the corridor from the LSE lecture hall, used to intervene in his lectures when Feyerabend made a point he disagreed with (SFS, p. 13, KT, p. 128).
2.13 Against Method (1970–75)
After stints in London, Berlin, and Yale (all of them running alongside his post at UC Berkeley), Feyerabend took up a chair at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and lectured there in 1972 and 1974 (pp. 134–5). He even considered settling down in New Zealand around that time (p. 153), although this hardly seems compatible with his jet-setting lifestyle.
By the early 1970s Feyerabend had flown the falsificationist coop and was ready expound his own perspective on scientific method. In 1970, he published a long article entitled “Against Method” in which he attacked several prominent accounts of scientific methodology. In their correspondence, he and Lakatos subsequently planned the construction of a debate volume, to be entitled For and Against Method, in which Lakatos would put forward the “rationalist” case that there was an identifiable set of rules of scientific method which make all good science science, and Feyerabend would attack it. Lakatos' unexpected death in February 1974, which seems to have shocked Feyerabend deeply, meant that the rationalist part of the joint work was never completed.
Later that year, Feyerabend found himself lecturing at the University of Sussex:
I have no idea why and how I went to the University of Sussex at Brighton… what I do remember is that I taught two terms (1974/1975) and then resigned; twelve hours a week (one lecture course, the rest tutorials) was too much. (p. 153).
A member of Feyerabend's audience recalls things in rather more detail:
Sussex University: the start of the Autumn Term, 1974. There was not a seat to be had in the biggest Arts lecture theatre on campus. Taut with anticipation, we waited expectantly and impatiently for the advertized event to begin. He was not on time—as usual. In fact rumour had it that he would not be appearing at all that illness (or was it just ennui? or perhaps a mistress?) had confined him to bed. But just as we began sadly to reconcile ourselves to the idea that there would be no performance that day at all, Paul Feyerabend burst through the door at the front of the packed hall. Rather pale, and supporting himself on a short metal crutch, he walked with a limp across to the blackboard. Removing his sweater he picked up the chalk and wrote down three questions one beneath the other: What's so great about knowledge? What's so great about science? What's so great about truth? We were not going to be disappointed after all!
During the following weeks of that term, and for the rest of his year as a visiting lecturer, Feyerabend demolished virtually every traditional academic boundary. He held no idea and no person sacred. With unprecedented energy and enthusiasm he discussed anything from Aristotle to the Azande. How does science differ from witchcraft? Does it provide the only rational way of cognitively organizing our experience? What should we do if the pursuit of truth cripples our intellects and stunts our individuality? Suddenly epistemology became an exhilarating area of investigation.
Feyerabend created spaces in which people could breathe again. He demanded of philosophers that they be receptive to ideas from the most disparate and apparently far-flung domains, and insisted that only in this way could they understand the processes whereby knowledge grows. His listeners were enthralled, and he held his huge audiences until, too ill and too exhausted to continue, he simply began repeating himself. But not before he had brought the house down by writing “Aristotle” in three-foot high letters on the blackboard and then writing “Popper” in tiny, virtually illegible letters beneath it! (John Krige, Science, Revolution and Discontinuity, (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 106–7).
Because his health was poor, Feyerabend started seeing a healer who had been recommended to him. The treatment was successful, and thenceforth Feyerabend used to refer to his own case as an example of both the failures of orthodox medicine and the largely unexplored possibilities of “alternative” or traditional remedies.
Instead of the volume written jointly with Lakatos, Feyerabend put together his tour de force, the book version of Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975), which he sometimes conceived of as a letter to Lakatos (to whom the book is dedicated). A more accurate description, however, is the one given in his autobiography:
AM is not a book, it is a collage. It contains descriptions, analyses, arguments that I had published, in almost the same words, ten, fifteen, even twenty years earlier… I arranged them in a suitable order, added transitions, replaced moderate passages with more outrageous ones, and called the result “anarchism”. I loved to shock people… (pp. 139, 142).
The book contained many of the themes mentioned so far in this essay, sprinkled into a case study of the transition from geocentric to heliocentric astronomy. But whereas he had previously been arguing in favour of methodology (a “pluralistic” methodology, that is), he had now become dissatisfied with any methodology. He emphasised that older scientific theories, like Aristotle's theory of motion, had powerful empirical and argumentative support, and stressed, correlatively, that the heroes of the scientific revolution, such as Galileo, were not as scrupulous as they were sometimes represented to be. He portrayed Galileo as making full use of rhetoric, propaganda, and various epistemological tricks in order to support the heliocentric position. The Galileo case is crucial for Feyerabend, since the “scientific revolution” is his paradigm of scientific progress and of radical conceptual change, and Galileo is his hero of the scientific revolution. He also sought further to downgrade the importance of empirical arguments by suggesting that aesthetic criteria, personal whims and social factors have a far more decisive role in the history of science than rationalist or empiricist historiography would indicate.
Against Method explicitly drew the “epistemological anarchist” conclusion that there are no useful and exceptionless methodological rules governing the progress of science or the growth of knowledge. The history of science is so complex that if we insist on a general methodology which will not inhibit progress the only “rule” it will contain will be the useless suggestion: “anything goes”. In particular, logical empiricist methodologies and Popper's Critical Rationalism would inhibit scientific progress by enforcing restrictive conditions on new theories. The more sophisticated “methodology of scientific research programmes” developed by Lakatos either contains ungrounded value-judgements about what constitutes good science, or is reasonable only because it is epistemological anarchism in disguise. The phenomenon of incommensurability renders the standards which these “rationalists” use for comparing theories inapplicable. The book thus (understandably) had Feyerabend branded an “irrationalist”. At a time when Kuhn was downplaying the “irrationalist” implications of his own book, Feyerabend was perceived to be casting himself in the role others already saw as his for the taking. (He did not, however, commit himself to political anarchism. His political philosophy was a mixture of liberalism and social democracy).
He later said:
One of my motives for writing Against Method was to free people from the tyranny of philosophical obfuscators and abstract concepts such as “truth”, “reality”, or “objectivity”, which narrow people's vision and ways of being in the world. Formulating what I thought were my own attitude and convictions, I unfortunately ended up by introducing concepts of similar rigidity, such as “democracy”, “tradition”, or “relative truth”. Now that I am aware of it, I wonder how it happened. The urge to explain one's own ideas, not simply, not in a story, but by means of a “systematic account”, is powerful indeed. (pp. 179–80).
2.14 The Political Consequences of Epistemological Anarchism: Science in a Free Society (1978)
The critical reaction to Against Method seems to have taken Feyerabend by surprise. He was shocked to be accused of being aggressive and nasty, so he replied by accusing his accusers of the very same thing. He felt it necessary to respond to most of the book's major reviews in print, and later assembled these replies into a section of his next book, Science in a Free Society, entitled “Conversations with Illiterates”. Here he berated the unfortunate reviewers for having misread Against Method, as well as for being constitutionally incapable of distinguishing between irony, playfulness, argument by reductio ad absurdum, and the (apparently rather few) things he had really committed himself to in AM. The spectacle of Feyerabend levelling these accusations at others is not itself without irony. (His widow reports that in his later years, SFS was the book he would most like to have distanced himself from). In the commotion surrounding AM, Feyerabend succumbed to depression:
… now I was alone, sick with some unknown affliction; my private life was in a mess, and I was without a defense. I often wished I had never written that fucking book. (KT, p. 147).
Feyerabend saw himself as having undermined the arguments for science's privileged position within culture, and much of his later work was a critique of the position of science within Western societies. Because there is no scientific method, we can't justify science as the best way of acquiring knowledge. And the results of science don't prove its excellence, since these results have often depended on the presence of non-scientific elements, science prevails only because “the show has been rigged in its favour” (SFS, p. 102), and other traditions, despite their achievements, have never been given a chance. The truth, he suggests, is that
science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted it without ever having examined its advantages and its limits (AM, p. 295).
The separation of church and state should therefore be supplemented by the separation of science and state, in order for us to achieve the humanity we are capable of. Setting up the ideal of a free society as “a society in which all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power” (SFS, p. 9), Feyerabend argues that science is a threat to democracy. To defend society against science we should place science under democratic control and be intensely sceptical about scientific “experts”, consulting them only if they are controlled democratically by juries of laypeople.
2.15 Ten Wonderful Years: The Eighties in Berkeley and Zurich
Out of all Feyerabend's many academic positions, perhaps the one he enjoyed most was his tenure throughout the 1980s at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zurich. Feyerabend applied for the post after his friend Eric Jantsch had told him that the Polytechnic was looking for a philosopher of science. The selection process was, by Feyerabend's account, very long and somewhat involved (pp. 154ff.). Having recently left another post in Kassel, he apparently gave up hopes of being hired by the Swiss, and “decided to remain in Berkeley and stop moving about” (p. 158). But, after several stages in the decision-making procedure, he was finally given the job, and “ten wonderful years of half-Berkeley, half-Switzerland” (p. 158) turned out to be exactly what he had been looking for. At Zurich he lectured on Plato's Theaetetus and Timaeus, and then on Aristotle's Physics. The two-hour seminars, many of which were organised by Christian Thomas (with whom Feyerabend was to edit anthologies) were run on the same lines as Berkeley: no set topic, but presentations by the participants (p. 160). Feyerabend later considered this to be the period in which he “got his intellectual act together” (p. 162), meaning that he recovered from the critical reactions to Against Method and was finally freed from the necessity of defending it against all criticism. However, this didn't seem to have affected his attitude towards work: in Zurich he refused offers of an office, because no office meant no office hours, and therefore no waste of time (pp. 131, 158)!
Many of the more important papers Feyerabend published during the mid-1980s were collected together in Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987). The major message of this book is that relativism is the solution to the problems of conflicting beliefs and of conflicting ways of life. Feyerabend starts by suggesting that the contemporary intellectual scene in Western culture is by no means as fragmented and cacophonous as many intellectuals would have us believe. The surface diversity belies a deeper uniformity, a monotony generated and sustained by the cultural and ideological imperialism which the West uses to beat its opponents into submission. Such uniformity, however, can be shown to be harmful even when judged by the standards of those who impose it. Cultural diversity, which already exists in some societies, is a good thing not least because it affords the best defence against totalitarian domination.
Feyerabend proposes to support the idea of cultural diversity both positively, by producing considerations in its favour, and negatively “by criticising philosophies that oppose it” (FTR, p. 5). Contemporary philosophies of the latter type are said to rest on the notions of Objectivity and Reason. He seeks to undermine the former notion by pointing out that confrontations between cultures with strongly held opinions which are each believed by members of the cultures in question to be objectively true can turn out in different ways. The result of such confrontation may be the persistence of the old views, fruitful and mutual interaction, relativism, or argumentative evaluation. “Relativism” here means the decision to treat the other people's form of life and the beliefs it embodies as “true-for-them”, while treating our own views as “true-for-us”. Feyerabend feels that this is an appropriate way to resolve such confrontation.
Admittedly, these outcomes are indeed possible. But this does not establish any form of relativism. Indeed, we might as well turn the argument around, and say that the possibility of the dispute being resolved by one participant freely coming around to the other's point of view shows the untenability of relativism.
Feyerabend complains that the ideas of reason and rationality are “ambiguous and never clearly explained” (FTR, p. 10); they are deified hangovers from autocratic times which no longer have any content but whose “halo of excellence” (ibid.) clings to them and lends them spurious respectability:
[R]ationalism has no identifiable content and reason no recognisable agenda over and above the principles of the party that happens to have appropriated its name. All it does now is to lend class to the general drive towards monotony. It is time to disengage Reason from this drive and, as it has been thoroughly compromised by the association, to bid it farewell. (FTR, p. 13).
Relativism is the tool with which Feyerabend hopes to “undermine the very basis of Reason” (ibid.). But is it Reason with a capital “R”, the philosophers' abstraction alone, that is to be renounced, or reason itself too? Feyerabend is on weak ground when he claims that “Reason” is a philosophers' notion which has no content, for it is precisely the philosopher who is willing to attach a specific content to the formal notion of rationality (unlike the layperson, whose notion of reason is closer to what Feyerabend calls the “material” conception, where to be rational is “to avoid certain views and to accept others” (ibid., p. 10)).
Relativism is a result of cultural confrontation, an “attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of cultural variety” (FTR, p. 19). Feyerabend is well aware that the term “relativism” itself is understood in many different ways. But his attempt to occupy a substantial yet defensible relativist position is a failure. At some points he merely endorses views which no-one would deny, but which do not deserve to be called relativist (such as the idea that people may profit from studying other points of view, no matter how strongly they hold their own view (FTR, p. 20)). At others he does manage to subscribe to a genuinely relativist view, but fails to show why it must be accepted.
It was only in 1988, on the 50th anniversary of Austria's unification with Germany, that Feyerabend became interested in his past (p. 1). The Feyerabends left California for life in Switzerland and Italy in the fall of 1989 (p. 2). It was during this move that Feyerabend re-discovered his mother's suicide note (p. 9), which may have been one of the factors that spurred him to write his autobiography. Feyerabend looked forward to his retirement, and he and Grazia decided to try to have children. He claimed to have forgotten the thirty-five years of his academic career almost as quickly as he had earlier forgotten his military service (p. 168).
2.16 Feyerabend in the Nineties
Feyerabend published a surprisingly large number of papers in the 1990s (although many of them were short ones with overlapping content). Several appeared in a new journal, Common Knowledge, in whose inauguration he lent a hand, and which set out to integrate insights from all parts of the intellectual landscape.
Although these papers were on scattered subjects, there are some strong themes running through them, several of which bear comparison with what gets called “post-modernism” (see Preston [forthcoming]). Here I shall sketch only the main ones.
One of the projects which Feyerabend worked on for a long time, but never really brought to completion, went under the name “The Rise of Western Rationalism”. Under this umbrella he hoped to show that Reason (with a capital “R”) and Science had displaced the binding principles of previous world-views not as the result of having won an argument, but as the result of power-play. While the first philosophers (the pre-Socratic thinkers) had interesting views, their attempt to replace, streamline or rationalise the folk-wisdom which surrounded them was eminently resistible. Their introduction of the appearance/reality dichotomy made nonsense of many of the things people had previously known. Even nowadays, indigenous cultures and counter-cultural practices provide alternatives to Reason and that nasty Western science.
However, Feyerabend recognised that this is to present science as too much of a monolith. In most of his work after Against Method, he emphasises what has come to be known as the “disunity of science”. Science, he insists, is a collage, not a system or a unified project. Not only does it include plenty of components derived from distinctly “non-scientific” disciplines, but these components are often vital parts of the “progress” science has made (using whatever criterion of progress you prefer). Science is a collection of theories, practices, research traditions and world-views whose range of application is not well-determined and whose merits vary to a great extent. All this can be summed up in his slogan: “Science is not one thing, it is many.”
Likewise, the supposed ontological correlate of science, “the world”, consists not only of one kind of thing but of countless kinds of things, things which cannot be “reduced” to one another. In fact, there is no good reason to suppose that the world has a single, determinate nature. Rather we inquirers construct the world in the course of our inquiries, and the plurality of our inquiries ensures that the world itself has a deeply plural quality: the Homeric gods and the microphysicist's subatomic particles are simply different ways in which “Being” responds to (different kinds of) inquiry. How the world is “in-itself” is for ever unknowable. In this respect, Feyerabend's last work can be thought of as aligned with “social constructivism”.
2.17 Conclusion: Last Things
Feyerabend's autobiography occupied him right up until his death on February 11th, 1994, at the Genolier Clinic, overlooking Lake Geneva. At the end of the book, he expressed the wish that what should remain of him would be “not papers, not final declarations, but love” (p. 181).
His autobiography was published in 1995, a third volume of his Philosophical Papers appeared in 1999, and his last book The Conquest of Abundance, , edited by Bert Terpstra, appeared in the same year. A volume of his papers on the philosophy of quantum mechanics is currently being prepared, under the editorship of Stefano Gattei.
Although the focus of philosophy of science has moved away from interest in scientific methodology in recent years, this is not due in any great measure to acceptance of Feyerabend's anti-methodological argument. His critique of science (which gave him the reputation for being an “anti-science philosopher”, “the worst enemy of science”, etc.) is patchy. Its flaws stem directly from his scientific realism. It sets up a straight confrontation between science and other belief-systems as if they are all aiming to do the same thing (give us “knowledge of the world”) and must be compared for how well they deliver the goods. A better approach would be, in Gilbert Ryle's words, “to draw uncompromising contrasts” between the businesses of science and those of other belief-systems. Such an approach fits far better with the theme Feyerabend approached later in his life: that of the disunity of science.
Feyerabend came to be seen as a leading cultural relativist, not just because he stressed that some theories are incommensurable, but also because he defended relativism in politics as well as in epistemology. His denunciations of aggressive Western imperialism, his critique of science itself, his conclusion that “objectively” there may be nothing to choose between the claims of science and those of astrology, voodoo, and alternative medicine, as well as his concern for environmental issues ensured that he was a hero of the anti-technological counter-culture.
Different components and phases of Feyerabend's work have influenced very different groups of thinkers. His early scientific realism, contextual theory of meaning, and the way he proposed to defend materialism were taken up by Paul and Patricia Churchland. Richard Rorty, for a time, also endorsed eliminative materialism. Feyerabend's critique of reductionism has influenced Cliff Hooker and John Dupré, and his general point of view influenced books such as Alan Chalmers' well-known introduction to philosophy of science What is this thing called science? (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1978).
Feyerabend has also had considerable influence within the social studies. He directly inspired books like D.L.Phillips' Abandoning Method (San Francisco, 1973), in which the attempt was made to transcend methodology. Less directly, he has exerted enormous influence on a generation of sociologists of science through his relativism, social constructivism, and apparent irrationalism. It is still far too early to say whether, and in what way, his philosophy will be remembered. [ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ]
"Paul Karl Feyerabend (January 13, 1924 – February 11, 1994) was an Austrian-born philosopher of science best known for his work as a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked for three decades (1958–1989). His life was a peripatetic one, as he lived at various times in England, the United States, New Zealand, Italy, and finally Switzerland. His major works include Against Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to Reason (a collection of papers published in 1987). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly anarchistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal methodological rules. He is an influential figure in the philosophy of science, and also in the sociology of scientific knowledge."
“All I have learned, I learned from basslines.”
Registered: Jul 2001
It's kind of sloppy but here goes nothing. Maybe I'll clean it up a bit when I get more time.
Aldous Leonard Huxley (26 July 1894 – 22 November 1963)
The really hopeless victims of mental illness are to be found among those who appear to be most normal. "Many of them are normal because they are so well adjusted to our mode of existence, because their human voice has been silenced so early in their lives, that they do not even struggle or suffer or develop symptoms as the neurotic does." They are normal not in what may be called the absolute sense of the word; they are normal only in relation to a profoundly abnormal society. Their perfect adjustment to that abnormal society is a measure of their mental sickness. These millions of abnormally normal people, living without fuss in a society to which, if they were fully human beings, they ought not to be adjusted, still cherish "the illusion of individuality," but in fact they have been to a great extent deindividualized. Their conformity is developing into something like uniformity. But "uniformity and freedom are incompatible. Uniformity and mental health are incompatible too. . . . Man is not made to be an automaton, and if he becomes one, the basis for mental health is destroyed."
- Aldous Huxley, Brave New World Revisited
Mindlessness and moral idiocy are not characteristically human attributes; they are symptoms of herd-poisoning.
- Aldous Huxley, Brave New World Revisited
Profession: Writer, Poet, Mystic, Social Critic
Aldous Huxley was an English writer whose most famous work is the 1932 novel Brave New World. Born into a family of distinguished intellectuals on both sides of the family, he graduated from Oxford in 1916 and went to work as a writer. He published poems and worked odd jobs in the early 1920s, until his first novels, Crome Yellow (1921) and Antic Hay (1923), earned him a reputation among the London literati as a gifted and witty cynic. Brave New World warned that a future utopia based on technology and social control would be a nightmare, a theme that resonated with readers in Europe and the U.S. During the 1930s Huxley bolstered his reputation as an essayist, and his intellectual pursuits turned increasingly to Eastern mysticism. He moved to the United States in 1937 and settled in southern California, where he worked as a screenwriter (including the 1940 adaptation of Jane Austin's Pride and Prejudice) and studied eastern religions with Gerald Heard and Swami Prabhavananda. He also experimented with hallucinogens, specifically mescaline and LSD. His writings about his experiences, The Doors of Perception (1954) and Heaven and Hell (1956), helped make him a counterculture hero in the 1960s. On his deathbed from cancer, he reportedly had his wife inject him with LSD during his final moments. His other novels include Eyeless in Gaza (1936), Time Must Have a Stop (1944) and Island (1962).
Huxley's famous ancestors included, on his mother's side, poet Matthew Arnold, and, on his father's side, Thomas Henry Huxley, famous champion of Charles Darwin. An eye ailment left Huxley blind for part of his college career, and he was plagued by poor eyesight off and on his entire life. He died on the same day as John F. Kennedy and C.S. Lewis.
Huxley was a humanist and pacifist, but was also latterly interested in spiritual subjects such as parapsychology and philosophical mysticism. He was also well known for advocating and taking hallucinogens and is considered by many to be the "spiritual father" of the hippie movement.
By the end of his life Huxley was considered, in some academic circles, a leader of modern thought and an intellectual of the highest rank.
On 21 October 1949 Huxley wrote to George Orwell, author of Nineteen Eighty-Four, congratulating Orwell on "how fine and how profoundly important the book is." In his letter to Orwell, he predicted that "Within the next generation I believe that the world's leaders will discover that infant conditioning and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging them and kicking them into obedience."
Anthologies and Selection
1925 Selected Poems, New York: Appleton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1926).
1932 Rotunda. London: Chatto & Windus.
1933 Retrospect: An Omnibus of Aldous Huxley's Books. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Doran.
1937 Rhys, Ernest (ed) Stories, Verses and Poems. London: J. M. Dent and Sons (Everyman’s Library, No. 935).
1944 Twice Seven: Fourteen Selected Stories
1946 Verses and a Comedy. London: Chatto & Windus.
1947 The World of Aldous Huxley: An Omnibus of His Fiction and Non-Fiction over Three Decades. Ed. Charles J. Rolo.
1957 Collected Short Stories. Franklin Center, PA: Franklin Library (1981).
1959 Collected Essays. New York: Harper.
1961 Selected Essays
1969 Great Short Works of Aldous Huxley. Bernard Bergonzi (ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
1971 Watt, Donald (ed.) The Collected Poetry. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Row.
1983 Selections. New York: Harper & Row.
1994 Bradshaw, David (ed.) Between the Wars: Essays and Letters. Chicago: I. R. Dee.
1931 "Obstacle Race." The Adelphi. April.
1934 "Sadist Satisfactions in War." The Listener. 14 November. 799-803.
1935 "1936... Peace?" The Star (London). 31 December.
1936 "Just Wars." The Times (London). 30 April.
"International Peace Campaign." The Times (London). 28 August.
"Collective Security." The Times (London). 19 September.
1941 "Dust." Decision. Klaus Mann (ed.). 1 January. 12-16.
1943 "Learning to See." Collier’s. April 17.
1947 "Talk of the Town." New Yorker. October 25.
1948 "A Note on Gandhi," in Vedanta and the West. April-May.
"The Double Crisis." World Review. December. 33-38.
1954 "A Case for ESP, Pk, and Psi." Life. January 11.
1962 "Education on the Nonverbal Level." Daedalus. 91. Spring. 279-293.
1964 "Shakespeare and Religion." Show Magazine.
1965 "Chaucer." Essays in Criticism. 15. January. 6-21.
"The Creation of a Notable Book." Quarterly Journal (US Library of Congress). 22. April. 79. 158.
1969 "The Politics of Population." The Center Magazine. 2 March. 13-19.
1967 The Crows of Pearblossom. New York, NY: Random House (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968).
1924 The Discovery (Adaptation for the modern stage of Frances Sheridan's play)
1931 The World of Light. London/Garden City, NY: Chatto & Windus/Doubleday, Doran & Co.
1948 The Gioconda Smile. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
1965 The Ambassador of Captripedia [sic]. Hi-Life. July.
1972 Christmas Sketch. Boston: Godine.
1961 Whiting, John Robert. The Devils. London: Heinemann.
1970 Rogers, David. Brave New World. Chicago: The Dramatic Publishing Co.
1916 Oxford Poetry 1916. Oxford: Basil H. Blackwell.
1932 D. H. Lawrence: Selected Letters. New York: Viking.
1937 An Encyclopaedia of Pacifism. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
Essays and Belles Lettres
1923 On the Margin: Notes and Essays. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1925 "Our Contemporary Hocus-Pocus." The Adelphi. May.
1926 Essays New and Old. London: Chatto & Windus (New York: Doran, 1927).
"Gods Propose, Men Dispose." Harper’s Magazine. October.
1927 "The Outlook for American Culture." Harper’s Magazine. August. Proper Studies. London: Chatto & Windus (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1928).
1929 "America and Europe." The Century Magazine. July. Do What You Will: Essays. London/Garden City, NY: Chatto & Windus/Doubleday, Doran & Co. Holy Face and other Essays. London: The Fleuron.
1930 Vulgarity in Literature and other Essays: Digressions from a Theme. London: Chatto & Windus.
1931 Music at Night and other Essays. London/Garden City, NY: Chatto & Windus/Doubleday, Doran & Co.
1932 Texts and Pretexts: An Anthology of Commentaries. London: Chatto & Windus (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933). T. H. Huxley as a Man of Letters. London: Macmillan.
1933 "The Problem of Faith." Harper’s Magazine. January.
1934 "Do We Require Orgies?" The Yale Review. Summer.
1934 "Wars and Emotions." Life and Letters. April.
1935 Heard, Gerald and Aldous Huxley. The Significance of the New Pacifism: Two Addresses. Pamphlet.
"Turning Point." Literary America. February.
1936 "Notes on Propaganda." Harper’s Magazine. December. The Olive Tree and other Essays. London: Chatto & Windus (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937). What Are You Going To Do About It? The Case for Reconstructive Peace. New York: Harper & Brothers.
1937 Ends and Means: An Inquiry into the Nature of Ideas and into the Methods Employed for Their Realization. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
1938 The Elder Peter Bruegel. New York: Willey. The Most Agreeable Vice. Los Angeles, CA: The Ward Ritchie Press.
1940 Words and Their Meanings. Los Angeles, CA: The Ward Ritchie Press.
1941 Grey Eminence: A Study in Religion and Politics (A Biography of Father Joseph). London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
1942 The Art of Seeing. New York: Harper & Brothers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1943).
1945 The Perennial Philosophy. New York: Harper & Brothers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946).
"Distractions I," in Christopher Isherwood (ed.), Vedanta for the Western World. Vedanta Press: Vedanta Society of Southern California. 126-27.
1946 Science, Liberty and Peace. London: Fellowship of Reconciliation/Harper’s.
1947 "If My Library Burned Tonight." House and Garden. November.
1949 Food and People. (With John Russell)
"My Favorite Records." [A list] Saturday Review of Literature. March 26. Prisons (with the Carceri Etchings by Piranesi). Los Angeles, CA: Zeitlin & Van Brugge.
1950 Themes and Variations. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
1951 Passage in John Yale (ed.), What Vedanta Means to Me: A Symposium. New York: Rider and Company.
1952 The Devils of Loudun. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
(Huxley, Aldous and Stuart Gilbert) Joyce the Artificer: Two Studies of Joyce's Methods. Pamphlet in the British Museum, London.
1953 A Day in Windsor (with J. A. Kings)
"Sludge and Sanctity." Esquire. June.
"The French of Paris." Esquire. December.
1954 The Doors of Perception. New York: Harper.
"Faith, Taste and History." Encounter. February.
1955 "Miracle in Lebanon." Esquire. August.
"Doodles in the Dictionary." Esquire. September.
"Censorship and Spoken Literature." Esquire. October.
"Liberty, Quality, Machinery." Esquire. November.
"Canned Fish." Encounter. December.
"Usually Destroyed." Encounter. December.
1956 Adonis and the Alphabet and other Essays. London: Chatto & Windus (Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow. New York: Harper & Brothers). Heaven and Hell. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
"Where Do You Live?" Esquire. May.
"Madness, Badness, Sadness." Esquire. June.
"Genius." Esquire. August.
"Facts and Fetishes." Esquire. September.
"A Case of Voluntary Ignorance." Esquire. October.
"Paradoxes of Progress." Esquire. November.
"Can We Be Well Educated?" Esquire. December.
1957 "Post-Mortem on Bridey." Esquire. January.
"Pleasures." Esquire. February.
"The Oddest Science." Esquire. March.
"Politics and Biology." Esquire. April.
"On Adaptation." Theatre Arts. December.
1959 "The Final Revolution." Contact 2. Issue dedicated to Huxley.
"The Final Revolution" in Feathersome, Robert M. and Alexander Simon (eds) A Pharmacologic Approach to the Study of the Mind. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 119-220.
1960 On Art and Artists. New York: Meridian.
1961 "The Shape of Things in 1986." True. February.
1962 "Unpainted Landscapes." Encounter. October.
1963 Literature and Science. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Row. The Politics of Ecology: The Question of Survival.
"The Only Way to Write a Modern Poem about a Nightmare." Harper’s Magazine. August.
"Salt." House and Garden. March.
"Statement for the Los Angeles Trial." George Wickes (ed.). Henry Miller and the Critics. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 175-176.
1964 "Culture and the Individual." David Solomon (ed.). LSD. New York: Putnam.
1965 "Shakespeare and Religion" in Julian Huxley (1969): 165-175.
"Variations on Goya." John Gassner and Sidney Thomas (eds.). The Nature of Art. New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 457-467. Practicas religiosas en Mesoamèrica [Religious Practices in Mid-America]. Guatemala: Josè de Pineda Ibarra.
1968 Form and Substance. Los Angeles, CA: The Plantin Press. New Fashioned Christmas. Berkeley, CA: The Hart Press.
"Usually Destroyed." Thomas Kane and Leonard J. Peters (eds.). Writing Prose Techniques. New York: Oxford UP, 308-319 (3rd edn.).
1970 America and the Future: An Essay. Austin, TX: Jenkins Publishing Co.
1974 Mori, Haruhide (ed.) (Aldous Huxley et al.) A Conversation on D. H. Lawrence. Los Angeles, CA: Friends of the UCLA Library.
1977 Ferrucci, Piero (ed.) The Human Situation: Lectures at Santa Barbara 1959. New York: Harper & Row.
Horowitz, Michael and Cynthia Palmer (eds.) Moksha: Writings on Psychedelics and the Visionary Experience (1931-1963). New York: Stonehill (London: Chatto & Windus, 1980).
1994 Aldous Huxley's Hearst Essays/. James Sexton (ed.), Garland: New York, 1994.
[David Bradshaw and James Sexton have recently completed a scholarly edition of Aldous Huxley's unpublished play Now More Than Ever for the University of Texas Press, Austin.
1998 Huxley, Aldous and Christopher Isherwood, Jacob’s Hands. London: Bloomsbury.
???? "Stars and the Man." The Hubble Collection.
???? "The Outlook for American Culture: Some Reflections in a Machine Age," in Peter Firchow, The End of Utopia. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.
1947 A Woman's Vengeance. Directed by Zoltan Korda. Also known as The Gioconda Smile.
1950 Prelude to Fame.
1971 The Devils. Directed by Ken Russell.
1972 Point Counter Point. Dramatization for a BBC series by Simon Raven.
1979 Il Piccolo Archimede. Directed by Gianni Amelio. English title: The Little Archimedes.
1980 Brave New World. Directed by Burt Brinckerhoff. TV.
1998 Brave New World. Directed by Leslie Libman and Larry Williams. TV.
1938 Madame Curie. U.S.: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (released 1943, Huxley's contribution was uncredited).
1940 Pride and Prejudice. U.S.: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Directed by Robert Z. Leonard.
1944 Jane Eyre. U.S.: Twentieth Century-Fox.
1947 A Woman's Vengeance. U.S.: Universal-International.
1951 Alice in Wonderland. U.S.: RKO (Huxley's contribution was uncredited).
1937 The Manuscripts of David Herbert Lawrence: A Descriptive Catalogue, by Lawrence Powell. Stories, Essays and Poems. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.
1939 Hunter, Allan. White Corpuscles in Europe. Chicago: Willet, Clark. 1-2.
1943 The Complete Etchings of Goya. London (?): George Brasillez.
1946 Brave New World. London/New York: Chatto & Collins/Harper & Brothers.
1954 The First and Last Freedom, by Jiddu Krishnamurti.
1955 Benodt, Hubert. The Supreme Doctrine: Psychological Encounters in Zen Thought. New York: Pantheon Books.
1960 Asvaghosa. The Awakening of Faith. New Hyde Park, NY: University Books. London: Charles Skilton, 1961.
1961 Eschelbach, Claire John and Joyce Lee Shober. Aldous Huxley: A Bibliography, 1916-1959. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
1962 Charter, S. P. R. Man on Earth. Sausalito, CA: Angel Island Pub. (New York: Grove Press, 1971).
Homolka, Florence. Focus on Art. New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc.
1968 Mystics and Society: A Point of View. Sisirkumar Ghose.
1971 Mann, Felix. Acupuncture: Cure of Many Diseases. London: Heinemann.
???? Bellamy, Edward. Looking Backward.
1950 Breit, Harvey. "Talk with Aldous Huxley," New York Times Book Review. May 21. 28.
1957 Unpublished interview at the UCLA School of Journalism. March 18. UCLA Library, Special Collections Department.
1958 Wallace, Mike. "Interview: Aldous Huxley." Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. 16 p.
1963 Interview in Cavalier. September.
1965 Craft, Robert. "With Aldous Huxley." Encounter. 25. November.
1972 Frazer, Ray and George Wicker. "Aldous Huxley" in Kay Dick (ed.) Writers at Work: Interviews from Paris Review. Hardmonsworth: Penguin, pp. 156-174.
???? Connolly, Cyril, in Picture Post.
1926 Taylor, Tom. The Autobiography and Memoirs of Benjamin Robert Haydon: 1786-1846. London: Peter Davies.
1932 The Letters of D.H. Lawrence. London/New York: Heinemann/Viking.
1934 Butler, Samuel. Erewhon. New York: Pynson Printers for the members of the Limited Editions Club.
1937 Ligt, Barthelemy de. The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution. London: G. Routledge & Sons Ltd.
Gregg, Richard. Training for Peace: A Programme for Peace Workers. London: George Routledge & Sons.
1938 They Still Draw Pictures. New York: Spanish Child Welfare Association of America for the American Friends Service Committee (New York: O.U.P., 1939).
1948 Radiguet, Raymond. Devil in the Flesh. Washington: Black Sun Press.
1951 Parkhurst, Helen. Exploring the Child's World. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
1954 Bhagavad-Gita: The Song of God. New York: Mentor.
Morgan, Louisa. Inside Yourself: A New Way to Health Based On the Alexander Technique. London: Stuttgart.
1961 Eschelbach, Claire John and Joyce Lee Shober. Aldous Huxley: A Bibliography 1916-1959. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (New York: Octagon Books, 1979).
1963 Starkey, Marion Lena. The Devils in Massachusetts: A Modern Inquiry Into the Salem Witch Trials. New York: Time, Inc. (Time Reading Program Special Edition).
1966 Inchiesta a Palermo/Poverty in Sicily: A Study of the Province of Palermo. Harmondsworth: Penguin (originally published as To Feed the Hungry, London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1959).
1969 Huxley, Laura Archera. You Are Not the Target: A Practical Manual of How to Cope with a World of Bewildering Change and Uncertainty. London: Heinemann.
1971 The Opportunities of a Night. Translated by Eric Sutton from Claude Prosper Jolyot de Crebillon's Le Nuit et le Moment). New York, NY: B. Blom.
???? Simon, Oliver and Jules Rodenberg. Printing of Today.
1987 Roth, Sanford. Portraits of the fifties. New York/San Francisco: Kampmann/Mercury House.
1988 Roth, Sanford. Paris in the fifties. New York/San Francisco: Kampmann/Mercury House.
1969 The Letters of Aldous Huxley. Ed. G. Smith. London: Chatto & Windus/New York, NY: Harper & Row (1970).
1976 (Presented by Clémentine Robert) Aldous Huxley; Exhumations: Correspondance inédite avec Sydney Schiff, 1925-1937. Paris: Didier.
1921 Crome Yellow. London: Chatto & Windus (New York: Doran, 1922).
1923 Antic Hay. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1925 Those Barren Leaves. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1928 Point Counter Point. London/Garden City, N.Y.: Chatto & Windus/Doubleday, Doran & Co. Inc.
1932 Brave New World. London/Garden City, N.Y.: Chatto & Windus/ Doubleday, Doran & Co. Inc.
1936 Eyeless in Gaza. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/ Harper & Brothers.
1939 After Many a Summer Dies the Swam. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
1944 Time Must Have a Stop. New York: Harper & Brothers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1945).
1948 Ape and Essence. New York: Harper & Brothers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1949).
1955 The Genius and the Goddess. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Harper & Brothers.
1962 Island. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/ Harper & Row.
1916 The Burning Wheel. London: B. H. Blackwell
1917 Jonah. London: Holywell Press.
1918 The Defeat of Youth and other Poems. London: B. H. Blackwell/Greens: Longman.
1920 Leda. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1921 "Love Letter." The Chapbook. January.
1925 Selected Poems
1929 Arabia Infelix and other Poems. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1931 The Cicadas and other Poems. London: Chatto & Windus/Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co.
1943 Orion. San Francisco: The Eucalyptus Press.
1929 Burns, J. H. A Vision of Education. London: Williamson and Norgate.
1930 This Way to Paradise (dramatization of Point Counter Point by Campbell Dixon).
1944 "Introduction" to Bhagavad-Ghita. Trans. Prabhavananda and Isherwood. New York: New American Library.
1948 Modern Artist in Transition. Beverly Hills, CA: The Modern Institute of Art.
1930 [Aldous Huxley reads from his works; Selections]
???? The politics of Ecology. Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.
???? A Series of Talks On the Human Situation. New York: Giffard Assoc.
1962 Tangents of Technology. Santa Barbara, CA.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.
1969 Science Fiction As Fact: Aldous Huxley and Marc Connelly Discuss Man and his Machine. Hollywood: Center for Cassette Studies
1973 Aldous Huxley Speaking Personally. New York:Caedmon.
1983 "After Many a Summer Dies the Swan." Minneapolis: Metacom.
1933 "Lawrence in Etruria." Contempo. January 10.
1936 Russell, Bertrand. Which Way to Peace? "The Pacifist Case." The Listener. 21 October. 785.
1941 Alexander, F. Mathias. The Universal Constant in Living. Saturday Review of Literature. 25 October. 17-18.
1920 Limbo: Six Stories and a Play
1922 Mortal Coils: Five Stories. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1924 Little Mexican (US. Young Archimedes). London: Chatto & Windus/US: Doran.
1926 Two or Three Graces: Four Stories. London/New York: Chatto & Windus/Doran.
1930 Brief Candles (US. After the Fireworks). London/Garden City, NY: Chatto & Windus/Doubleday, Doran & Co.
1938 The Gioconda Smile: A Story. London: Chatto & Windus.
1954 "Consider the Lilies." The London Magazine. November.
1961 "The Ambassador of Capripedia" in Huxley, Aldous et al. The Ambassador and Other Sophisticated Stories. New York: Belmont.
1921 A Virgin Heart, by Rémy de Gourmont. New York: Nicholas L. Brown.
1956 L'Apres-Midi d'un Faune, by Mallarmé
1925 Along the Road: Notes and Essays of a Tourist. London: Chatto & Windus/US: Doran.
1926 Jesting Pilate: An Intellectual Holiday (The Diary of a Journey). London: Chatto & Windus/US: Doran.
1934 Beyond the Mexique Bay. London: Chatto & Windus/US: Harper & Brothers.[/COLOR]
There will be, in the next generation or so, a pharmacological method of making people love their servitude, and producing dictatorship without tears, so to speak, producing a kind of painless concentration camp for entire societies, so that people will in fact have their liberties taken away from them, but will rather enjoy it, because they will be distracted from any desire to rebel by propaganda or brainwashing, or brainwashing enhanced by pharmacological methods. And this seems to be the final revolution.
- Aldous Huxley, at a lecture given to the Tavistock Group, California Medical School, June 27, 1961